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From High in the Paper Tower,
An Essay on von Humboldt's University
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGELt

One of the great questions to be answered in this now
no longer brand new century is whether the professionalization of the academic disciplines that accompanied the rise
of the bureaucratic university was on balance a good thing
or a bad. On the one hand, there is the great expansion of
knowledge that has accompanied these two phenomena,
joined at the hip as they are. On the other is the denuding
of the great expanses of forest and the loss of the hydrocarbons that have provided paper and ink for acres of scholarship that is at best forgettable and at worst ...

well, better

not said. Some has been gained, and much lost, in the pursuit of tenure and thereafter of, not even the fifteen
minutes of fame that Andy Warhol promised, but of the two
and a half minutes that the hottest new idea in any discipline may hope for today.
For many of the post-war years the ticket to tenure and
fame in the social sciences was some minor variation on the
activity of counting, some new or newly applied mathematical technique or some new subject matter to be counted or
better, both. Now, I have nothing against counting, as it is
both important to know whether one is talking about one
instance, one hundred instances or one hundred thousand
of them. Similarly it is important to understand whether
the things counted are all instances of the same thing or
whether they tend to clump into distinguishable groups.
t Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo, and Roger and
Karen Jones Faculty Scholar. This piece is for Al Katz who long ago pointed out
to me that the most important use of the verb "think" is in the intransitive.
Someone who had listened to my conversations with Guyora, Neil, David,
Rebecca, Michael, Peter, Tom, Alex, Fred, Janet, John, Pierre, Rob and Bert
could identify fragments of these interchanges in what follows. All have worked
to improve this piece, each in his or her own way. I thank my interlocutors for
their helpful comments as well as for their patience with my continuing
perversity. That also would scream loudly to such a listener.
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But counting and clumping have their limits, as do all techniques of inquiry. And so, quite soon, diminishing returns
set in, not the least due to the fact that if one has to count
and clump, then one can only ask questions for which
counting and clumping are an even vaguely plausible activity. Thus constricting the knowable is, of course, one of
the great risks of professionalization of any kind.
The tiresomeness of the production of orderly rows of
neatly counted and clumped scholarship led some people to
feel a breath (and breadth) of fresh air in the French scholarship that wafted across the Atlantic about twenty-five
years ago. First seen in the humanities, it then advanced
into law, and finally colonized the social sciences. Why this
body of scholarship was called post-modern is not at all
obvious. After all, the relevant books largely exemplified
the application of enlightenment critique to the objects and
categories of thought, and so of language itself, an activity
that is as post-modern as Descartes and Kant. Granted,
Descartes and Kant attempted to ground thought in one
way or another and the new French guys celebrated the
ungroundedness of thought with equal intensity. But such
quibbles about the branding of an attitude aside, this scholarship turned Derrida and Foucault into buzz words in the
brief span of fifteen years, always a bad sign. Fairly soon
everything was being problematized and play could be seen
everywhere. As the song goes, "Everything old was new
again."
Then, with an astonishing rapidity, what was initially
fresh air turned into a verbal fog. Within a half generation
the carnivalesque, with its overtones of licentiousness and
frivolity, became the transgressiveness of almost anything
including, I suppose, a harried junior naval officer's hiding
marbles in the captain's overhead and throwing his potted
palm overboard.' "Progressive" came to mean anything that
I like that most other people don't. And so, a wonderful
world of new possibilities turned into an academic industry
of rendering once well understood human activities into an
otherworldly language that made such activities seem more
mysterious, and less funny, than Mork going off to the
1. This is vaguely the plot of "Mister Roberts," a wonderful 1955 film about
life on a World War II supply ship, that starred James Cagney, Henry Fonda,
Jack Lemmon, and William Powell. Lemmon received an Oscar for his
performance as the junior naval officer.
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2
grocery store to buy a loaf of bread. Somehow Foucault's
basic insight that, as my former colleague, Al Katz, once
put it to me, the milk does not have to be in the dairy case
at the grocery store; it could be with the beverages, with the
cola and the beer-or to say it more formally, that no position on any subject could be taken as obvious, but all positions need to be explicitly defended-became something
quite different. The idea that even our conventions require
a defense was somehow converted into the assumption that
any assertion outside the mainstream needed no more defense than that it was outside the mainstream. The notion
that things might be otherwise became the notion that good
reasons need be supplied only for the status quo, which was
by definition not progressive, and that it was an author's
special, social position that made the progressive, progressive, as if the authority of social position were not the
previously offered justification for slavery, coverture and
suffrage limited to substantial property holders.
What, if anything, does all this mean for Wilhelm von
Humboldt's idea of the University? Answering such a question requires first a brief review of that idea. Von
Humboldt, a member of the minor German nobility, was a
philologist who became the Prussian equivalent of minister
of education during 1809-10. As such he was responsible for
planning what became known as the University of Berlin.
His plans emphasized the importance of Wissenschaft, of
science seen as objective and scholarly knowledge about the
worlds of nature and of human affairs. Wissenschaft,
understood as an activity, was conceived of as part of a
lifelong process of Bildung, of reaching an individual's
intellectual and moral, that is human, potential, a potential
that was conceived of as encompassing the ideal of the
cultivated man, and so, in a fully social and political
context. What was new in von Humboldt's idea of a University was the assertion that the ideal of Bildung could be
realized by a broadening and deepening of the University's
traditional tasks of providing professional or vocational
training, by teaching all of the sciences that could be

2. In the late 1970s to early 1980s sit-corn, "Mork and Mindy," Robin
Williams played Mork, a naive alien who lived with a single female, Mindy, and
of
explored her world in bits and pieces by engaging in the most mundane
of
absurdity
the
highlighted
gently
activities. In so doing Williams
contemporary social conventions.
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presented wissenschaftlich. Professors were to be free of
state interference as they sought and conveyed knowledge
(Lehrfreiheit)and students were similarly to be free to pursue their studies as they wished (Lernfreiheit). However,
the efforts of both professor and student, though separate in
that each is individually animated by the pursuit Bildung,
were together directed toward the objective cultivation of
Wissenschaft in the "deepest and widest sense" understood
as focused on "knowledge as a not yet wholly solved
problem" that therefore required continuous "investigation
and research."3 Stripped of its Germanic verbal fog, in von
Humboldt's University scholars, independently acting as
such, would engage in research-the continuous, rigorous,
and precise examination of phenomena in the world
designed to disclose the truth, seen as a unity, about that
world-and teach the results of that research to students
who similarly were independently attempting to develop an
understanding of the world as part of realizing their full
potential as citizens embedded in a social and political context. Implicitly, the activity of each depended on the exercise of an innate curiosity about the world.
How this idea has fared over time is a separate matter.4
Creating an institution that would specialize in the scientific, that is rational (after all von Humboldt was a philologist) study of the phenomena of the universe made real
3. See HUMANIST WITHOUT PORTFOLIO, AN ANTHOLOGY OF THE WRITINGS OF
WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT 132, 132-33. (Marianne Cowan
trans., Wayne

State
Univ. Press 1963). "Uber die innere and aussere Organization de hoheren
wissenschaftlichen Anstalten zu Berlin," Gesammelte Schriften (Herausgegeben
von der Koniglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften) (Berlin:
B.
Behr's Verlag, 1903), pp. 2 50-260. University Reform in Germany - On the Spirit
and the Organizational Framework of Intellectual Institutions in Berlin
8
MINERVA 242, 242 n.3 (E. Shills trans., 1970). "Wissenschaft,"
"Bildung,"
"Lehrfreiheit," and "Lernfreiheit"are terms that do not translate easily
into
English the meaning of which have been fought over for many years. Indeed,
von Humboldt's prose does not translate easily into English as can be seen from
comparing the translation above with the complete translation. See id. at 242250. For some understanding of the context of these ideas, see PAUL R. SWEET,
2
WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT: A BIOGRAPHY 3-71 (1980).
4. Neil Duxbury calls me up short for providing an historical and
sociological account of the fate of von Humboldt's idea in the United States,
but
not an intellectual one. The complaint is well taken. I have chosen this course
of
action because I believe that, in the States at least, this idea has had
been
largely deployed as a Christmas tree decoration for presidential and decanal
prose. Proving this proposition would require much more space that the essay
form can tolerate.
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sense in the early nineteenth century. The opening of much
of the world to European exploration and study promised a
vast expansion of European knowledge, a promise that was
realized for the people there. It was an idea that had some
traction, even as late as the middle of the twentieth century, when Robert Maynard Hutchins, no longer president
of the University of Chicago, still trumpeted as the University's project "round[ing] out the circle of knowledge."'
But, by Hutchins' time, von Humboldt's idea had
already run into trouble on this side of the Atlantic, though
it is not clear that any one thing caused the trouble. Science
as rational ordering-the sense in which chemistry, law,
philology and zoology were all sciences-a kind of gentleman's learning, never fit terribly well with the modestly
democratic ethos of the now forcibly United States. Our late
nineteenth century economic expansion brought with it an
increase in white collar managerial jobs that provided an
avenue to middle class social status in addition to the one
provided by the traditional professions of law, medicine and
theology. The resulting expansion of the middle class slowly
altered the social significance of higher education from a
none too serious privilege of an already acknowledged elite
to a somewhat more serious credential that established
membership in the now more numerous lower reaches of
that elite.
The expansion of the size of institutions of higher education that accompanied the expansion of the middle class
meant that there could no longer be but a single professor of
any subject. This expansion, plus the offering of elective
courses and even majors, resulted in the multiplication of
professors and lesser folk and led to the creation of the
bureaucratic entities that are departments, designed for the
coordination of instruction in an area of learning. The
importation of the Germanic idea of the necessity for a
teacher to acquire advanced training in a subject before
being allowed to teach it to others, led to the establishment
of the specialized Ph.D. degree in this country. This addition of graduate training to the traditional college fair
further allowed the now larger departments to submit to
their urge to gather in specialized sub-groupings of their
5. Robert M. Hutchins, The University Law School, in THE LAW SCHOOL OF
TOMORROW: THE PROJECTION OF AN IDEAL 5, 13 (David Harber & Julius Cohen
eds., 1968).
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similarly inclined brethren. (There were very few sistren.)
Then, the now invariable list of professional organizations
such as the American Political Science Association or the
American Sociological Association emerged, and thereafter
came the specialized journals for the publication of the
knowledge acquired by the members of this now more numerous, more tightly grouped, more highly educated collection of individuals.
All of these changes interacted so that, by the end of the
First World War, the once small, religiously affiliated
college, which in its separate way maintained von
Humboldt's commitment to an education appropriate to the
cultivated man, had either forsaken that path and become a
modest university, or forsworn such an alteration of its
scope and purpose, either in the name of piety or of liberal
education. During the same years, the small state university had begun its pattern of slow growth into a somewhat
academic institution that delivered credentials to the children of the middle class and some support to state interests
by focusing on agriculture, commerce and engineering.
Equally importantly, it allowed, by somewhat constraining,
the high jinx that littered the road to maturity and ensured
that late adolescent mating rituals would take place in a
largely safe, because predominately rural, environment,
away from parental embarrassment. All such institutions
reached a form that we would recognize todaydepartmental organization in terms of what were generally
conceded to be separate disciplines.
These same changes supported the professionalization
process in academia, a process integral to the establishment
of a modestly secure middle class status in general and
academic autonomy, the American version of Lehrfreiheit,
called academic freedom, in particular. This process is
almost timeless, appearing earlier in the establishment of
the merchant and craft guilds that provided the economic
base for a middle class existence of their members, the
original bourgeoisie, at the time of the growth of European
towns in the twelfth through fifteenth centuries. And it is
simple to describe. Identify a subject matter that is different from those claimed by others; exclude the amateurs
from the group, either with state sanction or with group
defined educational qualifications or better, both; establish
a set of categories that are the intellectual project; and
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finally claim a distinctive method or approach to the subject
matter.
Academics in the natural sciences, social sciences and
humanities all followed this recipe. Doing so made a certain
amount of sense. Academics are not all created equal, but
like most humans have different talents. As my colleague,
Fred Konefsky, offered, once he could hit a fastball, but he
never could throw one. Similarly, while I can understand
modern genetics and even find it fascinating, I lack the
physical dexterity and the patience to do the lab work that
such a research topic requires. Each discipline gathers
those with similar talents and creates a market for those
talents, as it were. Thus, participation in a discipline as a
unit of organization became the lowest common
denominator for the odd collection of separately talented
individuals gathered in the university. It became the common ground from which the claim of self-governance, of
independence from the State, that is at the root of any profession, might be asserted, however lamely, in such
pointless bodies as the "Academic Senate."
This professionalization process has been endlessly
repeated. Lawyers did it; doctors did it; morticians did it.
Today teeth cleaners and nurserymen are doing it, not to
mention the long standing efforts of electricians, carpenters
and plumbers. Each group attempts to establish some control over the price of its members' services by differentiating product, excluding some people who might purport to do
the work, and claiming some distinctive knowledge,
preferably buttressed with an assertedly distinctive
method. Price control is, after all, the economic basis of a
middle class social existence, and the lack of price control is
what distinguishes the middle from the working class.
I see little reason to denigrate the professionalization
process. While there is much that is silly about what that
process has become---"professional" seems to have evolved
into meaning a somewhat dodgy "good," as in a massage
professional, a pest removal professional or a professional
model-the social effects surely have been positive overall.
There is nothing wrong with giving workers, however humble, a sense that they occupy a valued place in the division
of labor. Similarly, the broadened middle class that has
accompanied professionalization is likely to have been a
significant component in the maintenance and extension of
democratic government, however imperfect. And the proc-
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ess has provided effective support for redistributive taxation, given that only in the broad middle class are there
enough marginal dollars to make redistribution effective.
Where academic matters are concerned, however,
professionalization has proven to be more troublesome. Von
Humboldt's vision of the University was driven by a faith in
the intellectual curiosity of both faculty and students. It
staked its claim to relatively autonomous self-government,
to its independence from the State, on the notion that,
driven by faculty and student curiosity about the world, the
University's researches would lead to truths that would
then be taught to the citizenry. Such was a plausible claim
in the nineteenth century. It was even a plausible claim
through the first half of the twentieth century. And the
existence of the claim made it easier for the notion of a discipline housed in a separate department to spread throughout the academy, replacing armchair speculation with more
solid facts, if not necessarily better interpretations. Whole
areas of knowledge were transformed, particularly in the
sciences, and to a lesser extent in the social sciences and
humanities.
. At the same time however, the agreed understandings
in the disciplines that made possible the significant growth
of knowledge began to limit the intellectual curiosity of the
members of the discipline. The very process of forging
agreement on the subject matter and method in a discipline
served to place certain topics, certain ways of thinking,
certain understandings or interpretations, certain categories, outside the discipline. As a social matter, how this
constriction of the knowable took place is quite obvious.
Membership in a group, participation in a discipline, was
established by exclusion, by a kind of intellectual policing,
for it is what we are not that defines what we are.
Subtle hints that others ought to become au courant or
leave could, if necessary, be followed by a certain amount of
bullying, all in the name of disciplinary imperatives. This
was because those who did not submit to the tenets of the
discipline obviously were not a part of the discipline, not a
part of the club. And so "discipline" began to refer to both a
way of thinking and, at the same time, those who thought
that way. Those who thought otherwise simply were no
longer there. Those who in the future might similarly be
inclined to stray from accepted paths, likewise could be
harried back to, or excluded from, the herd.
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This ritual of setting ourselves off from others was
surely understandable at the outset, when the professionalization project was so new and shaky. Without rules
establishing our separateness, it was impossible to identify
what we were and what that being stood for. It was impossible to get the university to set up a proper department
that we controlled. It was impossible to gather together
publicly to celebrate the achievement that was the establishment of a discipline at an annual meeting of those who
shared the knowledge produced by the discipline's members. It was impossible to welcome new members to the
group, to socialize them, in both senses, into the discipline.
At a time when it was generally agreed that the point of
research was the delineation of truth, the act of exclusion,
the demarcation of what was known because correctly
established through the process of group affirmation by the
insiders, a process that became known by the revealing
term "peer review," could be, and was, justified by its ends,
the truth obtained. After all, charity in the face of error is
an unusual virtue. Truth, like group identity, can only be
discovered as error is identified. But as the twentieth century wore on the notion that disciplinary activity is about
the delineation of truth became increasingly untenable in
all sorts of areas of learning.
The crumbling of the rock of truth on which von
Humboldt's University, and so disciplinary separateness,
was built, infected physics early on when first, Einstein's
theory of relativity made people worry about the fixity of
space and time, and then, Heisenberg's famous, if not well
understood, uncertainty principle made even Einstein invoke God and dice. That the knowledge of physics, the
material base of our universe, was based in situatedness,
and so necessarily implied partiality, and with partiality,
error, is the conclusion that many drew from Einstein and
Heisenberg. If this assertion were correct, then the one
thing that the University did not produce was truth.
The consequences of such a conclusion somewhat unexpectedly appeared first in anthropology. That discipline's
postulate of cultural relativism brought forth acres of
religious or socially conservative objections that allowed the
academics to feel superior to Mencken's "booboisie." Unfortunately, such a feeling of superiority allowed these same
academics to ignore an equally obvious implication from
cultural relativism; academics' knowledge itself was no less
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socially limited to the members of their several exotic
tribes. Luckily, or maybe not, the hot war against fascism
and the cold war against communism served to mute this
dispute with the citizenry, as well as to hide the broader
challenge that indeterminacy posed to the social edifice that
was von Humboldt's University.
Then, with the return of the GI's from World War II
and, remarkably soon thereafter, the explosion of the
student body in the sixties and early seventies that was
their children, came the great expansion of the university.
Its size grew apace and with that growth came a style of
academic self-promotion, the incessant effort to create fame,
that brought successive waves of change to the disciplines
and so magnified the inevitable politics in each. Accompanying this growth were the first signs of indeterminacy's
reappearance. It started with the discussion of Kuhn's work
in the history of the physical sciences. Questions about the
relevance of this work for the social sciences soon followed.
Many academic intellectuals vicariously participated in
debate over Kuhn's ideas by partisans of Lakatos or Popper
or, even worse, advocated Feyerabend's criticisms of both.
About the same time came the general leftward drift of the
academy following the Vietnam War. This drift was
accompanied by strident assertions that the old people in
various disciplines had shaped their scholarship--trimmed
here, expanded there-for political reasons. Unfortunately,
the sensible discussion of these issues got lost in the
continuing, understandable, perhaps even necessary, but
nevertheless ancillary, disputes that surrounded the great
explosion of female membership in the academic fraternity
and the lesser, but still contentious, increase in Black and
Hispanic membership.
The model of knowing that the academy eventually
arrived at in response to these political/social pressures and
intellectual disputes was one of the inclusion of perspectives, a kaleidoscopic vision of truth. If, on any issue,
enough perspectives could be brought to bear-ethnic, gender, class, sexual, geographic, human, ecological, species
transcendent and then their various cross specificitiessomehow the academy could still assert the universality of
its knowledge. And fancy French theory was deployed in
support of this vision (as well as full employment for
humanist scholars). Socially constructed understandings
sprouted in every little intellectual garden. As seldom was
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heard the terrible "T" word, the skies were not cloudy all
day.
Whether this vision of scholarship in the academy was
based on a plausible use of the relevant French learning is
not a particularly important question. For some it worked.
Everything could go on as before. The University, in the
guise of the "multiversity," could continue to educate the
children of the middle class and a modest number of working class aspirants. Departments could continue to be the
administrative units for personnel and degree granting
purposes. The disciplines, and so their vision of proper
preparation for work in a field, could continue to be the
intellectual building blocks of knowledge, tempered by
assertions of the need for inter-disciplinary teams to investigate certain problems, for inter-disciplinary perspectives
to be brought to bear in certain courses, and for thoroughgoing inter-disciplinarity in any thoroughly post-modern
scholar.
To many it seemed as if von Humboldt's idea of the
University, now reimagined as the multiversity's interdisciplinary interrogation of socially constructed practice,
was doing quite fine. Few noticed that there was more than
a little legerdemain, play as it were, in this defense of von
Humboldt's idea. The multiversity had completely forgotten
the generous, even free-floating, curiosity at the root of von
Humboldt's vision of the University. The invocation of interdisciplinarity largely remained an assertion of the
centrality of the disciplinary organization of the universe of
knowledge that earlier was the basis of the claim of any
university to be the University. It was only from a disciplinary redoubt that we would be, that we could ever identify,
the inter-disciplinary. And so the call for inter-disciplinary
scholarship was little more than the continuing assertion of
separation, a repetitive walling off of other disciplinary
perspectives, a quarantining of a potentially destructive virus. Inter-disciplinary scholarship was fine, but recognition
within the discipline was what really counted. After all, it
was the discipline that gave one a professional identity
from which one could be inter-disciplinary. It was the
discipline that made one an academic, a person in the allNo one could be a professional
knowing eye of scholarship.
6
inter-disciplinarian.
6. The proliferation of centers or institutes for the study of whatever does
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Although the tension inherent in a multi-disciplinarity
that proceeds from a disciplinary bastion was apparent to
all who chose to see, few made that choice. Only loonies
could conceive of an a-disciplinarity, a refusal to recognize
disciplinary boundaries, particularly those of subject and
method, coupled with a refusal to worry about a scholar's
standpoint or grounding for speech. Such marginal individuals pointed to the implausibility of any special claim to
knowing anywhere in the academy, turned social construction back on the disciplines, and found them wanting, as
little more than administrative conveniences for distributing paychecks and routing the mail. But almost all
academics recognized that it would be crazy to push fancy
French theory so far as to undermine the singular claims to
knowing made by individual disciplines and so by the
University. Without the structuring of knowing that was
provided by the disciplines, no one would ever be sure that
their work or anyone else's was really good, and without
such knowledge all would have to face the possibility of
living a working life without meaning, as well as the constant risk of being exposed as a fraud. Even if successful in
avoiding the embarrassment of exposure, all would have to
face the possibility of obscurity, even intellectual death.
Scholars might have to pay health insurance, mortgage
installments and college tuition from earnings as a public
intellectual and so have to have really good, or at least salable, ideas on a very regular basis. Worse still, they would

not undermine the point. They are classic bureaucratic solutions to ordinary
bureaucratic problems, generally created for one of two reasons. The most
common is to take advantage of some perceived funding stream-either funding
agency or donor supplied. These creations ossify like crazy as funder's priorities
change and so university administrators fight tooth and nail to shut them down
because they all come with a requirement for scarce university overhead
dollars. The second is to shut whiners up. University administrators are content
to let these remain in place so long as the whiners are a problem. In both cases
a significant force driving the establishment of such entities is the vanity of the
actual or putative grosse machers on the faculty, as Peter Goodrich reminds me.
There are oddities such as the University of Chicago's Committee on Social
Thought that persist for a long time after having been set up. When they persist
it is usually because they have degree-granting ability that centers or institutes
traditionally lack. Graduate students in centers or institutes more commonly
are remitted to the underlying disciplines for certification. And so these entities
recapitulate the centrality of the disciplinary organization of knowledge that is
so obvious in the case of inter-disciplinary scholarship generally.
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be seen as amateurs and so risk falling back into the working class.
I am not at all sure that these risks of abandoning the
institutionalized disciplines are real or, that they outweigh
the possible benefits of throwing off the tyranny of established ways of knowing.7 However, I can understand their
apparent weight. Consider the most obvious riskintellectual security. The university is a comfortable
bureaucracy, not an ivory, but a paper tower. Oh, yes, we
rail about the university bureaucracy all the time, but such
is the coffee talk of all knowledge workers who participate
in work groups larger than one or who have to interact with
any organization larger than the neighborhood dry cleaner.
Within the university a discipline is a comfortable bureaucracy as well. Both the university and the discipline tell us
what is right to do; both insulate us from having to exercise
personal judgment when it is painful or even when not
painful, but simply a distraction from our work. "The university requires is an easy way to dispose of difficult
questions of judgment posed by students. Similarly, "this is
a hot topic" and "this is how it is done in my discipline" are
easy ways to dispose of difficult questions about what
research to do and how to undertake that research. Curiosity may be channeled, but the risk of paralysis, of not
knowing what to do in a world of possibilities, is dampened
and so security, enhanced.
Disciplinarily founded locutions such as the foregoing
are comfortable because it is even difficult to understand
what personal judgment entails. As is often the case with
virtues, personal judgment is most easily understood by
looking at what it is not. It is not the repetition of whatever
is the accepted wisdom in the field, even though that is
often the easiest possible fall back position. Similarly, it is
not replying, "well, then, I guess that's OK after all" when
confronted with a teen's statement, "but all the other kids
are allowed to do it!" in the middle of an argument over
tattoos, nipple rings, driving a thousand miles alone or
joining the co-ed naked volleyball team. True, all judgment
7. I am not here or elsewhere advocating the abandonment of tenure in the
form of employment security. The question of employment security should be
seen as entirely separate from the way that tenure in a university,
unfortunately seen as tenure in a discipline, not just allows, but forces a
narrowing of available scholarly perspectives.

878

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

implies a frame of reference, but pace Stanley Fish and
even T. S. Eliot talking about "Tradition and the Individual
Talent," personal judgment need not be constrained by a
single accepted frame of reference, by any single discipline.
Because most humans participate in activities that provide
separate, sometime overlapping, sometimes not, frames of
reference, they may combine these frames in ways that can
vary from obvious syncretism to real novelty. We call such
exercises of synthesis creativity and even evidence of a
playfulness of mind. Can they lead into solipsism? Surely.
Can bureaucratic forces within or without the university
turn them into dreck? Of course. But neither the possibilities of solipsism nor the likelihood of dreck provide a
satisfactory argument for the impossibility of exercising
personal judgment.
Still, even when one understands what personal judgment is, such judgment is hard to exercise. None of us is
trained to do so even in those modest areas where such
training might be possible. Indeed, the absence of such
training is why, when we raise children, we talk endlessly
on the phone with those who have done so before and not
had things turn out too badly. It is why we read all of those
child rearing books that both advise new parents and
simultaneously create anxiety with their tales of normal
development. Judgment leaves us naked in public. Sexy
dressing is fine. Buff, maybe even better. But naked in
public is at its best a dream of unpreparedness for an exam
hiding other worries about other unpreparednesses. At its
worst, public nakedness is an offense to good taste. Hell,
even private nakedness leaves us vulnerable enough once
lust is satiated. And so, not surprisingly, it is in private, in
the dark of night, where exercises of judgment most haunt
us.
To exercise judgment is to be an adult, a hard job in a
society that perpetuates dependency until anything
between 16 and God knows when. And academic institutions are anything but adult making. Graduate education
somehow creates dependency in the name of producing
independent scholars. One is always left as child to parent
with respect to one's dissertation advisor, to the doctor
father, as the Germans tellingly put it. Peer judgment in
the discipline, most often essential to grant seekers-and in
the multiversity who is not?-and always essential to a
researcher seeking any but vanity press publication, is
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valued over personal judgment. And in some areas peer
judgment even reduces the role of the journal editor to some
combination of an election clerk and a high school guidance
counselor. In a lingeringly post-adolescent world, it is not
surprising that becoming a fully adult member of an
academic institution, achievement of the wonderfully
revealing "full" professorship, often doesn't come until 40,
or maybe never. Prolonged dependency, all of this time
under the surveillance of others in a panopticon without
walls, does not make the exercise of judgment easy.
Consider only the intellectual possibilities that straying
from peer judgment call up. If we exercise personal
judgment in intellectual matters, measure our discipline's
categories, find them wanting and substitute categories of
our own choosing, we court social obscurity and intellectual
death. What if no one understands? What if no one reads
because no one will publish? What if even internet publication becomes a fanzine with an audience of none, an
occasional eyeball, but no responses? After all, in the
multiversity knowledge is accumulated for the purpose of
publication. In that world, scholarship is only implausibly
knowledge if no one else reads it, no one else finds it illuminating, no one else believes it, no one else helps to extend it.
Working within a discipline thus both removes some of
the terror from the exercise of judgment and of the accompanying vision of social obscurity and intellectual death,
whatever the actual social and intellectual circumstances of
a particular scholar may be. For such a scholar participation in a discipline, especially when sharing a method,
provides a modestly impersonal way of recognizing my
group and yours in the bureaucratic structure that is any
university. In theory at least, it provides a similarly impersonal way of recognizing quality scholarship, though this
theory is not well supported in fact, but then human
institutions are like that. The discipline provides a ready, if
not willing, audience for one's work while cabining that
work in comfortable ways. Unfortunately, as it does so, it
significantly contracts the knowable, significantly dampens
omnivorous curiosity. For by making some knowledge
possible through the establishment of a shared system of
categories, it makes other knowledge unavailable.'
facile
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That unavailability is before our eyes every day with
the wondrous locutions that we develop to get around the
tyranny of our category systems. Consider historical sociology or legal anthropology or economic geography. Each is
both a recognized sub-discipline and a tombstone to the
inability of the parent discipline graciously to accommodate
certain inquiries. Sociology is and always will be primarily
the study of present society; real anthropology studies
exotic peoples who by definition do not have the law we
take seriously; geography is about extension in space no
matter what others say.
Sometimes such hybridization will not work. Cell and
molecular biology simply split off from the parent tree, as
has ecology. Marxist economics demonstrates a circumstance where a walling-off was necessary to maintain the
integrity of a category system and is accepted as such.
However, sometimes a potential category can't be made to
fit within the system, but unfortunately addresses problems
that are not so important as to necessitate formation of a
separate discipline or so threatening as to call for a wallingoff. Consider Buddhist law, a category that is impossible to
fit in any of the many already homeless, area studies nondisciplines, and would draw on non-western theology as
well.
Closer to my home there is the first year of law school, a
set of categories that demonstrates exactly how a category
system makes certain knowledge impossible. Consider
courses in bureaucracy or civil liability. The first would
highlight the commonalties between institutions as disparate as the courts, corporations, administrative agencies,
and law offices. It would make available to study the ways
that order is maintained through structure and procedure.
Civil liability would highlight the role of state recognized
understanding in tort, contract, and property in a way that
would undermine the foundational significance of those
had for its mission the demarcation of the knowable as part of an argument
against a more general disciplinarily based constriction of the knowable.
Although one might attribute such a juxtaposition to rampant post-modernism,
it would be more accurate to attribute it to my outrage that well paid, tenure
protected individuals are so insecure in their personal identity that they need to
support it with a professional, disciplinary identity that places off limits
knowledge that is most likely well within the philosophically appropriate
bounds. Lehrfreiheit is a license to dream. It should not be confused with a
sinecure from a dozing Prussian king.
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categories. At the same time it would make available to
direct study the way that social/political understandings of
appropriate behavior shape legal rule systems over large
swaths of the law, but render separate normative study of
the once separate subjects an antiquarian luxury. Neither
can be drawn out of the currently canonical courses, except
interstitially. Both make those courses in a real sense
irrelevant.
I do not purport to know what knowledge has been lost
because the current organization of the university is in
terms of the canonical disciplines. In a philosophical sense
no one could know. From within the university the best that
can be said is, "maybe a little; maybe a lot." On the positive
side, disciplines do provide useful categories and clearly,
thought is impossible without categories. Indeed, whatever
might seem to have been the case for Kant, for many,
without a disciplinary
seems impossible
critique
side, a question
negative
foundation. However, on the
any sense to
makes
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remains about the degree to
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truth
the
teaching
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knowing
Humboldt's University, to
about the universe of possible knowledge, however comfortable, is at best dubiously tenable. After all, it has become
reasonably clear that in one way Popper won his argument
with Kuhn: We can establish error, though only weakly in
many areas, but never truth.
Obviously the university can proceed as the multiversity, holding on to its kaleidoscope, even enjoying the
changing colors as funder's or disciplinary interests cause
the lens to turn. It can ignore the implausibility of the
rock-truth-that was its foundation for the foreseeable
future. Human institutions survive on the basis of implausible justifications all the time. The market has long been
justified by the notion that it brings choice to consumers,
even though it radically narrows choice to those things that
can in fact be purchased. The state has long claimed that it
works for the good of the people, even though it pays only
modest attention to any segment of the people other than
the upper classes, the subjects of law, as opposed to the
lower classes, its objects. So the question remains open: is it
appropriate for an institution that claims that the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge is its purpose to
continue to organize that process on the basis of a social
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formation that by definition makes some knowledge impossible to acquire?
This question should not be understood as one of
university administration. Even a small public high school
needs some structure between the teachers and the principal. A contemporary university needs more layers of
organization than such a school, to be sure. Departments
are a useful intermediate organizational form. However,
departments do not need to track the disciplines. They
could be organized as intentional communities, groups that
come together for so long as they share a common topic,
without regard to method or approach. Such an organization would not imply the institutionalization of a kind of
Maoist perpetual revolution. We have that already, courtesy of the mayflies of the academy and their search for
Warholian fame. We do not need more of the same. Rather,
such an organization implies a choice to give up on
authoritative understandings and so on revolutions
altogether. It implies the end of such intellectual bullying
by eliminating the basis for authoritative judgment.
Intentional departments could offer majors and grant
degrees, even the vaunted Ph.D. They might be the situs for
hiring new faculty and preparing cases for tenure, though,
given their possible ephemerality, the decision-making
might be more of a university function, as was the case in
the
von
Humboldt's
University
before
disciplinary/departmental
organization
became
the
norm.
Departments still would be a place to get mail and a paycheck, a place from which to offer classes, change health
insurance, play politics and grouse about one's colleagues.
But such departments would be organized for this day and
this train only, good only so long a there was something
beyond inertia holding them together. Students would still
learn, as they always have learned, what they wish to learn
and no more. They might undertake majors or not, just as
faculty might join a department or not, choosing instead to
pick up a paycheck at Human Resources and mail at the
Post Office.
Would most people, students and teachers, embrace
this freedom? I rather doubt it. However, some would be
free from an intellectual ordering that they find less than
compelling and therefore tyrannical, and the university
would be a trifle more honest in its stance toward the
world. But, many would forgo such freedom and instead go
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on much as before. After all, exercising personal judgment,
putting one's ass on the line, is scary. In intellectual matters it forces one to face the possibility that one has nothing
to say and wants to say it anyway. In the dark of night that
could be a significant cost to an accompanying freedom. One
would need to weigh such a cost carefully.
On the other hand, any purported cost in terms of social
security, of insulation from the fear of becoming working
class or a hungry public intellectual is likely to be ephemeral. The middle class needs a mark to establish its
children's class membership. Similarly, it wants a place to
park its children for some period of time that would allow
them to grow up, preferably one that would allow parents to
see no evil, hear no evil and speak no evil. And their kids
also want to be parked. After between thirteen and eighteen
years on a routinely boring, parentally overseen academic
treadmill, a worry free college life of booze, sex, and
occasionally entertaining classes must seem like nirvana.
Today the middle class is as willing as ever to pay the
university's fee, even though most know that what they are
paying for is of dubious value, apart from the credential
provided. It will continue to pay for this credential tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow, just as it once paid for the
grand tour, as implausible a basis for demarking class
membership as a major in art history, criminal justice, or
aerospace engineering. So long as a piece of paper comes
out at the end, payment will continue. It may even be better
that the topic attached to the degree be seen as frivolousthe twelfth century, prokaryotic cells, alchemy. Such
frivolity allows parents to feel put upon, always useful in
the inevitable fights over attention, behavior and becoming
a productive member of society. And it allows the university
to justify the price that it charges for the relevant
credential since, lord knows, the more esoteric the topic, the
an understanding of it can be procured elsewhere
less likely
9
less.
for
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sciences departments about the devaluation of the role of their graduate
programs, which is to say their role in dispensing Ph.D. degrees, and so
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So, it would seem that the macro-social constraints on

abandoning the disciplinary organization of knowledge in
the university are not likely to be overwhelming. The microsocial constraints are another matter. Being an academic is
a piece of the division of labor. It is a job, cleaner than
many, less lucrative than some, but not obviously more
rewarding than lots of others. Academics have taken this
job because they once believed that it suited their talents,
just as have butchers, bakers, and now again candlestick
makers. And like those jobs, it is anything but always
rewarding. It is dispiriting, to say the least, regularly to
attempt to teach something to a group of individuals many,
perhaps most, of whom would not be there listening
(assuming that they are, often a necessary self-delusion)
were it possible to become or remain middle class in some
other way. Scholarship is not all that it is cracked up to be
either. The fear that most people are ignoring, or worse
laughing at, ones latest publication is anything but
uncommon, even among academics firmly anchored in a
discipline. Shifts in scholarly fashion that threaten to make
ones embedded intellectual capital worthless are dreaded
by youth, as well as age. And much university service is
properly given over to those who "place a low value on their
time, and rightly so," as a colleague once observed.
Though I write with a certain amount of dogged hope, a
sense that academic professionalization has had costs, but
that its costs need not be a permanent drag on life in the
multiversity that von Humboldt's University has become,
my belief that things in the university might be different
does not mean that they will be different. Indeed, where
human institutions are concerned it is always sensible to
bet against significant change. So, it is time to draw up an
account, to measure the plausibility of my dogged hope.
Such an account would look at two complexes of entries.
One would be the university's delivery of education, its
teaching mission, and its delivery of credentials, its social
mission. The other complex would be its efforts toward
reproducing themselves, are growing in volume. Simultaneously,
one would
expect that, in the humanities and social sciences, the result of
increasing
numbers of masters candidates, whose presence undermines
the separate
specialness of departmental graduate programs, would be the growth
of the
post-doctoral fellowship that is now all but required for a teaching
post in the
natural sciences. Unfortunately, such fellowships are already institutionalized
at Starbucks or high end restaurants.
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scholarship and intellectual achievement. One may be done
well while the other is done poorly, though in evaluating
both it is important to remember that academics are
humans, despite their children's and student's belief to the
contrary, and so a certain tolerance for human frailty is in
order.
As to the first complex, that of teaching and credentialing, I deeply dislike the waste of students' time in
classes given by individuals who are, at best, content to
regurgitate the current wisdom of the discipline and at
worst, too dispirited to care. Still, it would be foolish to fail
to recognize that in the last fifty years the university has
been a more than modest step in the direction of extending
criteria for social advancement beyond proximity to elite
birth. Indeed, measured against the usual progress, a word
I choose carefully, of human institutions, it has been successful beyond reasonable expectations, however much
further we might think that it needs to go in this direction.
Here the university has a significant credit balance.
As to the second complex, that of scholarship and intellectual advance, the matter is more mixed. The waste of
natural resources that is the mediocrity, or worse, of much
scholarly output in any discipline is unbelievable, though it
would be more charitable for me to remember that the
quality of scholarship in any discipline is likely to be
normally distributed and so, much of it, by definition,
mediocre and some of it, worse. It would be more charitable
still to note that the knowledge that the disciplines have
accumulated is more a modest positive monument to the
human spirit, and less an example of human folly, than its
pointless inanities in fields such a law would make it seem.
Honesty then would force me to admit that here too the
university has a credit balance, though a smaller one.
If the university's balance then is positive, if giving in
to dispiriting fears by trusting the discipline to provide
guidance and maybe, just maybe, a dollop of approbation for
one's efforts, may help an academic to keep on trying in the
classroom and in the quiet of the office, then why has the
color of my presentation been so resolutely gray, my tone so
infused with the -hollow sadness of the English horn. It is
not because I wish that teaching or writing, much less
thinking (should it actually occur), would stop. Anything
but. Rather, I see gray and hear the English horn because,
despite the university's positive balance, at its root our
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practice is based on a significant, hopefully not intentional,
misunderstanding.
Despite university administrators' constant carping to
the contrary, the job of thinking and the job of credentialing
are in no sense the same job. They are quite different.
Foucault and his French compatriots were important first
for bringing to our attention an understanding of how
categories work and second for focusing our minds on
power, and so derivatively, on increasing and diversifying
the middle class. The academy by and large learned the
second lesson well. We did less well with the first lesson.
Endlessly focusing on categories, on positionality, on the
distribution of power, we continued to confuse scholarship,
a disciplinary activity, with thinking, with curiosity about
the world. We used a deep understanding of the process of
knowing that French scholarship provided to continue to
instantiate ways of knowing that this understanding was
designed to critique. This is not thinking. "Think" is best
understood as an intransitive verb. 10
Academics are highly privileged members of a privileged class. At bottom the deal that we made when
becoming part of the contemporary embodiment of von
Humboldt's University is that we would perform a socially
valuable credentialing task in exchange for time to think, to
let our curiosity about the world run free, and a significant,
though hardly complete, protection from adverse personal
consequences that might flow from our thought. We have
done reasonably well at credentialing and the university
has done reasonably well at providing protection. But for an
highly trained and possibly over privileged elite we have
done piss poor at thinking. Oh, we speak of how demeaning
it is to our role as thinkers to have to credential the middle
class and we talk endlessly as if our scholarship consisted
only of bombs well thrown at creaking social and intellectual edifices. But the disciplinarily formulaic in all its
10. For all of those who did not have Miss Nellie Clark, or some kindred
spirit, for eleventh grade, I provide the following grammatical aid: An
intransitive verb does not require an object; a transitive verb does. In the
sentence, "He runs," meaning he is a runner, "run" is used as an intransitive
verb. In contrast, in the sentence, "He runs to mother," "run" is used as a
transitive verb. Intransitive verbs as applied to humans implicitly extol the
doing of something for the sheer pleasure of the exercise that is the activity and,
as such, represents anything but a Deweyian understanding of the active
human personality.
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guises is the overwhelming product of'our efforts. Thinking
is not done by applying formulas. Thinking takes risks,
personal, social, intellectual risks that we of a privileged
elite are overwhelmingly chary of taking. The color gray is
our color; the English horn our proper sound.
And yet recognition of the overall success of the project
that is the university allows me a bit of hope that, though
recognizably human with all the weakness that such a
species being implies, academics still can try a bit harder to
shake off the disciplinary blinders that were once assumed
as part of our fight for social preferment. To escape completely the categories that the disciplines provide for us is
probably too much to ask. But to care less for those
boundaries, to loosen them, to be open to, to be tolerant of,
maybe even to welcome alternative categories when offered,
and more generally to stop bullying back in line those, even,
or maybe especially, the untenured, who chose to breach or
possibly ignore those boundaries, ought not to be too much
to ask from an educated elite. After all, almost nothing that
might be offered as an alternative to current disciplinary
categories is likely to corrupt the youth more than a dose of
MTV or VH1 or BET or Spike or worse, all together. And it
would be difficult to notice any possible increase in the rate
of depletion of trees and hydrocarbons from the appearance
of more pointless scholarship. It seems that such a
loosening, such an opening, might bring the university a
mite closer to what is now the only plausible rendering of
its original, laudable goal-systematically following our curiosity about our world. Doing so might get us closer to
encompassing the universe of potential knowledge. That
would be good.

